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EconomicConsequences of
Instalment Credit Fluctuations
ANALYSIS of the consequences following upon changes in
consumer instalment credit will be concerned chiefly with
the contribution of this type of credit to aggregate effective
demand. But in various places possible repercussions from
the impact of new credits on particular industries will also
be considered.
It is again convenient to distinguish between the long-run
growth and the cyclical fluctuations of instalment credit. We
shall. discuss, first, the effects of a rapid introduction of cre4it
and of its spread from one field to another. Second, we shall
consider the possible effects that may be brought by
the cessation, or conceivably by the mere slowing down, of
the :rate of growth of instalment credit. And finally we shall
assume that the institutional development has come to an
end, at least for the time being, and investigate the purely
cyclical forces still in operation.
The greater part of the analysis will have to be qualitative
and the conclusions must necessarily be rather tentative. This
is due not only to the inadequacy of our statistical informa-
tion. about vital aspects of instalment credit itself, but to
other factors as well. Even if we had absolutely complete
and reliable figures on outstandings and new credits (also
for the period before 1929), and if we were certain that
changes in the amount of credit outstanding translate them-
selves completely into changes in consumer expenditure—
or, j:nore generally, if we knew precisely to what extent new
credits and repayments are substitutes for other forms of dis-
savi:iig and saving—there would still remain questions about
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the indirect effects of changes in instalment credit which
cannot be answered definitely, because their satisfactory clari-
fication must await the solution of major problems of busi-
ness cycles and of the theory of economic dynamics in general.
EFFECTS OF A STRUCTURAL EXPANSION
There can be no doubt that, a rapid introduction of instal-
ment credit, facilitated by the perfection of lending machin-
ery and by the opening of the sluices between the money
market and this particular credit field, must have a stimu-
lating effect on the economy as a whole.1 Such .a development
took place in the years between 1920 and 1929. It is not
clear whether the' minor depressions of 1924 and 1927 were
marked by an appreciable contraction in outstanding instal-
ment credit as a whole; automobile credit shrank in 1927,
although furniture and .departmentstore .creditdid not.
Probably the depression of 1927 showed itself in a temporary
decline in the rate of advance rather than in an absolute
fall in the amount of outstanding instalment credit. Lack
of information makes it impossible to discuss the depression
of 1924. It is certain, however, that in neither year did any-
thing happen comparable to the contraction that occurred
between 1929 and 1933.2
But how should the stimulating effect connected with the
'first introduction and rapid growth of instalment credit be
expected to influence economic stability? Should this devel-
opment be regarded as fayorable or unfavorable for the at-
This statement needs qualification only in cases where the supply of loanable
funds is completely inelastic and where creditistherefore of the pure
transfer type. This will hardly ever be the case, even at the top of the
boom, but the stimulating force of a given expansion of credit will be
the weaker the doser credit approaches the transfertype, or the more
inelastic the supply of funds. Moreover, in a situation of complete employ-
merit a credit expansion could lead only to a price rise and not to a rise in
output.
2 conclusionis corroborated by Roif Nugent's (admittedly rough) annual
estimates of consumer credit outstandings for the period from 1923 on. Both
the recession of 1924 and that of 1927 indicate only a retardation of the
rale of growth. See his Consumer Credit and Economic Stability (1939) pp.
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taini:rient and maintenance of full employment and maxi-
mun:L output?
The answer to such questions will depend on a writer's
general attitude toward credit expansion, and will vary ac-
to his diagnosis of the economic situation during
the j:eriod when consumer instalment credit was introduced
and developed. We shall not attempt here to give a definitive
answer to these preliminary questions—either to the
theeffects of credit expansions in general
orthose concerning the diagnosis of a particular period.
The following pages will explore the implications for the
present problem of certain views which are widely held by
economists and which influence the general public.
During a cyclical depression, with growing unemployment
and excess capacity, with the volume of aggregate demand
cont:racting .and prices tending to fall, with the spirit of en-
terp:rise failing in an atmosphere of pessimism, and with
shrinking, most writers would regard the intro-
duction or development of consumer instalment credit as a
desirable antidote to contraction.3 Furthermore, most econo-
mist:; would contend that the situation is not materially
changed when an acute contraction has come to an end and
the economic system either "bumps along the bottom" of
the depression or starts gradually on a new expansion. So
long as there are idle productive resources an expansion of
consumer demand brought about by the introduction and
development of instalment credit will be regarded as a desir-
able factor. It will either lift the system out of the agony of
the depression or, if it has already started on an upward
movement, hasten the upswing and the reemployment of
resources
Unfortunately, however, instalment credit is not likely to make great strides
during an acute depression, though the expansion of FHA loans in 1938
woul:I seem to suggest possibilities to the contrary.
Thre is general agreement, however, great care must be exercised
in diagnosing the existence of underutilized productive resources. The mere
existence, on the statistical record, of large numbers of unemployed persons
does not imply that output can be easily expanded in every direction at
const;mnt or only slightly rising costs. The statistically recorded unemployedCONSEQUENCES OF FLUCTUATIONS 119
The farther the economic system gets away from the trough
of a depression, and the closer it approaches a state of full
employment, the sharper becomes the divergence of opinion
among different writers with respect both to their diagnosis
of concrete situations and to their general theory (if they
have any) about the factors that are likely to bring about a
downturn, and consequently about the policies or develop-
ments best calculated to avoid, postpone or mitigate the col-
lapse of the upswing.
There is, on the one hand, the large group of "oversaving"
or "underconsumption" theorists who believe that the great-
est threat to a smooth economic development and full utili-
zation of resources is excessive saving, that is, saving in ex-
cess of available investment opportunities. This theory is
widely held at present, and is strongly supported by such
influential writers as J. M. Keynes and Alvin H. Hansen and
their followers. It can be briefly stimmarized as At
any income level people will save a certain part of their
income; in general when income rises the amount saved will
also rise.5 If any existing level of income is to be maintained
the money which the savers fail to spend on consumption
must be spent on investment goods, either by the savers
themselves or by somebody else who borrows from them di-
rectly or indirectly. The writers mentioned above see a grow-
ing danger that not all savings will find an outlet in invest-
ment. They believe that a chronic dearth of investment
opportunities is to be expected in the future. Reasons for
this chronic dearth are thought to be the reduction or cessa-
tion of population growth, the impossibility of discovering
51t is generally agreed that not only the amount of saving but also the
proportion of income saved will increase. But for the purpose in hand
the weaker assumption that the amount increases is sufficient.
do not represent a pool of homogeneous labor on which every industry can
draw. In view of the notorious lack of mobility of labor much depends
on the composition of this pool. If its occupational and geographical distri-
bution is not favorable for an expansion of output in a particular direction.
more or less serious bottlenecks will make their appearance and the -ex-
pansion will exhaust itself in a rise of costs and prices. with a relatively
small increase in output.120 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
new territories of the kind that absorbed large quantities of
capital in the past, impediments to international lending.
The result is that saving has tended, and will, increasingly
tend., to exceed investment.8 Such an excess of current saving
over current investment means deflation; the flow of money
cannot be maintained, demand falls off, prices sag and output
shrinks.
Oj:i the basis of such views one must come to the conclu-
sion that anything which tends to decrease savings or increase
will relieve the situation and raise output and
employment. The introduction and development of con-
sumr instalment credit is certainly a powerful factor of,
this kind.7 In the Keynesian terminology its effect can be
consi:rued either as a rise in the marginal efficiency of capital
(if the acquisition of durable consumer goods is regarded as
an i]lvestment) or as a rise in the marginal propensity to
consume (if "soft" goods are bought or if the purchase of du-
goods is counted as consumption).8 In both cases the re-
suit is an increase in the volume of output and employment.
Thewritersof this school do not hesitate to apply this
reasoning to interpreting the economic development of the
twenties. According to A. H. Hansen the rise in the output
of durable consumer goods, the investment in "consumer
capii:al," of which the automobile was the most important
item, and the way in which this rise was financed, constituted
one of the factors responsible for the boom of the 1920's.
"Th.e prosperity of the postwar decade rested heavily upon:
(1) building; (2) public construction, financed
heavily by government deficits—witness the ten billion dol-
lar increase in state and local government debt; (3) .a large
exp(:)rt surplus, financed by foreign loans; (4) the rise to full
maturity of the great automobile industry; and (5) the grow-
°A g)od statement of this view will be found in G. Coim and F. Lehmann,
Economic Consequences of Recent American •Tax Policy, Part I (Supplement
I of aocial Research, 1938).
We have seen, however, that the long-run influence on saving is not so clear.,
terminology depends on the choice between the broader and nar-
rowew definition of saving, distinguished in Chapter 2 and Appendix A.CONSEQUENCES OF FLUCTUATIONS 121
ing importance of durable consumers' goods, financed in
large part by a billion dollar annual growth in instalment
credit."9 Hansen then asks how the "new era" would have
fared without these factors. "Had these [factors]'° been miss-
ing, would business capital outlays have filled the gap? Is
there not a high probability that with these stimuli removed
business capital expenditures would have been made on a
more restricted scale, leaving the economy stagnant if not
depressed?"
The precisely opposite view is held by writers such as F. A.
Hayek, L. Mises, A. Spiethoff. They do not believe that a
lack of investment opportunities compared with the flow of
saving is the typical obstacle to the continuation of an up-
swing and the maintenance of business activity on a high
level. On the contrary, according to their opinion, prosperity
periods are interrupted by a scarcity of capital for productive
purposes, that is, by excessive consumption (undersaving)
rather than by oversaving (underconsumption). Hayek and
Mises, moreover, believe that a scarcity of capital is neces-
sarily brought about by a credit expansion and that any ex-
pansion of credit must sooner or later lead to a crisis and
depression.
Although these writers have not specifically dealt with the
problem of consumer instalment credit, it clearly follows
from their theory that they must regard the introduction
and development of such credit as a dangerous and destabi-
lizing factor, operating to bring about or to intensify an "un-
healthy" boom and to make the inevitable reaction all the
more serious and violent.12
9A. H. Hansen, Full Recovery or Stagnation? p. 298.
10Hehere mentions only three of the factors enumerated above: "the ac-
cumulated backlog of housing requirements ..., therapid capital expendi.
tures of state and local bodies, and the rather reckless foreign lending."
The same question, however, applies just as well to the other two items
in the list, although they are perhaps of smaller quantitative import.
'1Thid., p. 298.
12Theoreticalanalysis along such lines has been applied by many writers
to the boom of the 1920's and its collapse in 1929. It may be sufficient to
mention but two such works: L. Robbins, The Great Depression (London
1935); and C. A. Phillips, T. F. McManus and R. W. Nelson, Banking and122 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
Between these two diametrically opposite groups there are
other writers like D. H. Robertson who refuse to generalize,
and hold that a boom may be brought to an end by different
forc s—by oversaving (insufficiency of consumer demand) in
some cases, by undersaving (scarcity of capital) in others and
by still other types of maladjustments and disturbances.13
From these views it would follow that a development which
stimulates consumption, like the introduction of consumer
instalment credit on a considerable scale, may sometimes
be conducive, and at other times detrimental, to economic
stability.
In short, then, there can be little doubt or disagreement
about the immediate effects of the introduction and develop-
men t of consumer instalment credit: it is clearly of a stimu-
lating character. But judgment concerning its bearing on
economic stability as a whole must depend on one's theoreti-
cal views about the cycle and one's diagnosis of the concrete
EFFECTS OF A CESSATION OR CURTAILMENT
OF STRUCTURAL GROWTH
It goes without saying that an institutional contraction of
instalment credit would be a depressing factor. If, for ex-
ample, instalment selling were abolished, the effect would
be highly deflationary.'4 There can hardly be disagreement
18 See Robertson's Essays in Monetary Theory (London 1940), especially "In-
dustrial Fluctuations and the Natural Rate of Interest" (pp. 83 if.) and "A
Survey of Modern Monetary Controversy" (pp. 133 if.). See also Gottfried
Haberler, Prosperity and Depression (editions of• 1939 and later) pp.
and
a decline could be brought about, for example, by government
measures designed to dose or narrow the passage between the money market
and the consumer credit In this country, until recently, the tendency
was in the opposite. direction; governments and monetary authorities tried
to remove impediments to the flow of funds into consumer credit. The
Fedei:al Housing Administration and the Electric Home and Farm Authority,
the Business Cycle, A Study of the Great Depression in the United States
(1937t. Neither of these works mentions the rise of instalment credit specifi-
cally; but there can be no doubt that it fits perfectly well into both books'
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on this point. Even those who feel critical and apprehensive
of what they would call the "artificial" stimulation afforded
by the initial introduction and development, of consumer
instalment credit, would admit that its subsequent contrac-
tion must have a depressing influence. The evil effects of a
credit inflation cannot be undone by a subsequent deflation.
It seems plausible, however, that, even if there is no actual
contraction, a sudden cessation of growth or perhaps only
a marked slowing down of the rate of progress will have a
depressing effect. And it is very likely that after a period of
structural expansion, during which the financial machinery
has been perfected to meet the new demands and instalment
credit has gradually spread over the whole area that can be
handled under the existing institutional framework and pro-
cedures, there will occur at least a temporary cessation or a
considerable slowing down of the rate of advance.
Such a temporary resting point seems to have been reached
in 1929; certainly the advance from the peak in 1929 to the
next one in 1937 was insignificant as compared with the
expansion that occurred in the 1920's. But although there
are good reasons (as we shall see immediately) to believe
that such a break in the trend will have unfavorable reper-
cussions on the economy as a whole, it is not possible to
evaluate concretely the contribution of this factor to the
collapse of the boom of 1929. Too many different factors
were involved to permit the separation of the effects of a
through their operating policies, have tried to encourage liberal credit stand.
ards and to familiarize private institutions with the consumer instalment
credit business. But government measures of an opposite kind are also
familiar. In Nazi Germany, even long before the outbreak of the war,
the authorities strongly discouraged or even stifled consumer credit. This
action is quite in line with the general objectives of German economic
policy in recent years; the problem there has been not to stimulate business
but to prevent government spending from leading to outright inflation, and
hence any method that keeps down private expenditure, both on consump-
tion and on investment, must be welcome. This country, after a long period
of underutilization of resources, has found itself in a similar situation since
defense expenditure has threatened to lead to inflation. In such a situation
a policy of contracting or abolishing consumer credit must find a place in
the armory of restrictive (anti-inflationary) weapons. This subjectisdis-
cussed in Chapter 6.124 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
•single one.'5 Moreover, it is very difficult, if not impossible,
to sparate in a concrete instance the cyclical from the secular
factor. The outstanding feature of the charts presented in
Chapter 3 is the cyclical drop that occurred in all credit
series after 1929. This would have had serious consequences
even, if the next peak of 1937 had been so much higher than
the :peak of 1929 that one could hardly speak of a 1929 break
insecular trend, even a temporary one.
Those who believe in the dangers of a chronic tendency
of saving to outrun the existing investment opportunities,
and who see in the development of instalment credit a wel-
come outlet or offset for savings, will naturally conclude that
a cessation or a mere decrease in the growth of such credit
will, automatically increase the deflationary pressure. But
eve]:1 if one does not accept this theory of vanishing invest-
merit opportunities there are reasons to believe that a break
in the upward trend of instalment credit may cause a tem-
porary disturbance.
is, first, a danger that in a new field of business
which still lacks the guidance of a well-established tradition,
mistakes will be made,'6 unsound practices will develop and
rap:i.d growth will overshoot the mark and necessitate a re-
trei:tchment. The critics of the instalment system in the
l92D's who denounced it as a destabilizing factor were
cerned mainly with these dangers. But the instalment credit
business seems to have avoided these perils to a remarkable
degree.
us now abstract from such a development. Assume
thai: outstanding credit ceases to grow, new credits becoming
151t should be noted that we are not here concerned with. the deflationary
pull exerted by the contraction of instalment credit which occurred after
the breakdown of the boom in 1929 and continued until 1953. This con-
must be explained mainly as a result of (and as an intensifying
factorin)the cyclicaldepression, which would have occurredinsub-
stanl:ially the same degree even if the 1929 break in the upward trend of
credit had not contributed to the interruption of the upswing
in that year.
16Mistakes,that is, in a pure credit sense, a poor selection of credit risks
leading to avoidable delinquencies and losses.CONSEQUENCES OF FLUCTUATIONS 125
roughly equal to repayments. There is not yet an actual con-
traction, only a cessation of expansion. The purchasing
power of consumers is not actually reduced, as it would be
if repayments exceeded new loans; there is thus no defla-
tionary effect, but the stimulating effect has ceased. The ex-
isting amount of outstanding credit is maintained as a re-
volving fund but it no longer grows. In considering the
unfavorable reactions that are likely to result from such a
change we shall for the present ignore possible influences on
industries whose products are closely connected with the
expansion of instalment credit. The first problem is the gen-
eral effect on the economy as a whole.
As long as consumer instalment credit was expanding, ex-
penditure on consumption was increasing and consumption
goods industries experienced a rise in sales and perhaps also
in prices.'7 When the rise in demand and prices comes to
an end, producers, if they have become accustomed to the
rise in prices and have been. led to expect it to continue, will
suffer losses and will react by reducing output. But even if
prices had not risen in the consumption industries, and no
rise had been expected by producers in these trades, dis-
turbances would be likely to occur in other industries. The
mere fact that demand for a number of consumer goods was
rising for a while and then stopped rising (without as yet
actually falling) would probably bring about an absolute
contraction of demand for, and hence output of, certain
types of goods—producer goods used in production of con-
sumer goods.
The reason for this is that consumption industries, as
long as they are expanding output (at rising or constant
prices), are adding to their equipment. When they stop in-
creasing production, or perhaps even when they reduce the
rate of increase too quickly (without reducing absolutely the
volume of output), they will reduce or cease their purchases
1TThe following reasoning would apply alsoif the demand for, the
prices of, consumption goods did not rise but was prevented by instalment
credit from falling or from falling faster.126 ECONOMICFLUCTUATIONS
of equipment. Thus there may occur disturbances in certain
producer goods industries, even if no troubles arise in the
consumption industries immediately concerned; the latter
may effect the transition from an expanding to a stationary
state quite smoothly.
All this is merely an application of a well-known theorem
of business cycle theory, the principle of "acceleration and
magnification of derived demand." According to this prin-
changes in rate of increase in demand for the product
of any industry tend to be transmitted with increasing vio-
len:e to the so-called "higher stages of production"—those
industries which supply machines and other means of pro-
ducition to the industry in which the original change in de-
mand occurred.
Fi: is tlue that a complete and adequate statement of this
theory would necessitate a number of qualifications, relating
mainly to the existence of excess capacity, changes in the
methods of production, the state of expectations, and fluctu-
aticns in the replacement of existing equipment. It is even
conceivable that the transition from an expanding to a sta-
tior:tary state of affairs could be achieved quite smoothly;
this might be the case if replacement demand rose in pro-
portion to the decline in demand for new equipment, or,
toit the other way around, if the decline in demand for
nevir equipment were offset by a gradual rise in replacement
demand. But such a smooth development would imply a
particular timing and a unique quantitative relationship of
the various processes which can hardly be expected to exist
in practice.18
'8Fr a discussion in greater detail see Haberler, op. cit., pp.54,55, 112.
is of the opinion that this type of maladjustment can be avoided,
and that a smooth transition from an expansion to a stationary state (or
a rapid to a slower expansion) will be effected in all cases by the
autcimatic working of the price mechanism, unless the expansion in output
ofdurable goods is "artificially" stimulated and financed' by an inflationary
credit expansion. No proof has been forthcoming, however, that would show
the necessity or even the probability of such a smooth. development (see
F. A. Hayek, Prices and Production, revised edition, London 1935).CONSEQUENCES OF FLUCTUATIONS 127
EFFECTS OF STRUCTURAL CREDIT EXPANSION
ON PARTICULAR INDUSTRIES
If we assume that the direct effect of instalment credit is
not widely diffused over the whole field of consumer goods,
but is highly concentrated on particular products, we can
apply analyses similar to those used in the preceding sections
in order to trace the repercussions on particular industries
of the introduction and rapid institutional growth of instal-
ment credit, and of a break in its trend. If the industries so
affected are important enough, the cyclical movement of
the economy as a whole may be affected. It should be noted
that this effect is independent of cyclical fluctuations of in-
stalment credit itself; such fluctuations will be discussed in
the following section.
Among the industries directly affected by an expansion of
instalment credit it is those producing durable goods rather
than those producing perishable goods that are exposed to
the most significant repercussions. The reason for this may
be shown by .an analysis of a much simplified hypothetical
example. Let us assume that a new non-durable good, say
grapefruit, is introduced to consumers. Consumption and
sales rise rapidly and reach a saturation point;'9 thereafter
consumption per unit of time no longer rises, but stays at
the maximum level that has been reached. Production will
also reach a maximum at that level, and stay there, for there
is no reason for it to fall below that level. It is possible, of
course, that production may overshoot the mark and run
ahead of consumption, necessitating a downward adjustment
of output. Producers may expect a continued rise in demand
and expand production beyond what turns out to be the
maximum level set by the saturation of consumer demand.
Other possibilities .are that demand may be subject to spon-
taneous changes or that a speculative accumulation of stocks
may cause trouble. But all these sources of maladjustment
19lnstead of in terms of a saturation point the argument could be put in
terms of a reduction in the speed of progress.128 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
between production and consumption, supply and demand,
are present also in the field of durable goods.
In durable goods, however, there is an additional possi-
bilii:y of maladjustment that is not present in the case of
non-durable goods. If the new commodity introduced to the
consumer was a durable one, say the automobile, here too
sale;; to the ultimate consumer will rise and somewhere a
saturation point for the services of automobiles may be
reached.2° Now the factor of durability becomes important.
If the automobile has been introduced so rapidly that the
saturation point for its services is reached before the first
sold is replaced, then the demand for new auto-
will fall to zero, although the consumption of au-
toinobile services has not declined at all, but has simply
to rise.2'
Here we have, reduced to the simplest possible terms, the
difference between the behavior of demand for durable and
for perishable goods. A durable good is a bundle of services
that become available, successively, over a certain, period of
It follows that the consumptiOn of these services can
continue for a long time almost unimpaired, .withoutany
additions being made to the stock of durable goods that
provide the services—how long depending, of course, upon
the durability and the age distribution of the durable goods
in use. This means that if the current consumption of serv-
ices is to be raised (assuming that there are no unutilized
goods in the hands of consumers) it can be done only by
providing' services for a certain period ahead as well as for
20The saturation may be a temporary one. When it is reached and how long
it la,3ts will depend upon many factors—the wealth of the community, the
price of automobiles, their technological progress and obsolescence, operating
expenses, the carrying capacity of highways, and the like. When the under-
situation changes, a new wave may start and lift the saturation point
to a, higher level. Here again the argument could be presented in terms
of a slowing down of progress rather than in terms of an absolute (perma-
neni: or temporary) saturation. This would be much more realistic, but it
woul.d not throw into such high relief the relationship we are interested in.
2imight be instructive to consider the case of an infinitely durable good,
that is, one that does not require replacement. Railway embankments may
becase in point. In this case production would cease altogether if the
required stock were once constructed.CONSEQUENCES OF FLUCTUATIONS 129
the present: current services can be supplied only by dura-
ble goods that contain not only current but also future
services.22
This is again an application of the acceleration principle
of derived demand. Again all sorts of qualifications must be
made, and certain situations are conceivable in which the
transition from a rising to a stationary level of demand for
the final product (services) can be made smoothly, without
fluctuations in the demand for the good itself. Again the
possibility of a smooth transition depends on a particular
relation between new demand and replacement demand. For
example, in order to attain smoothly the maximum demand
for automobiles which may be maintained indefinitely at
remunerative prices, this demand must be satisfied gradually
in a particular way, so that replacement demand will grad-
ually take the place of new demand. Otherwise there will
be a drop in demand for, and thus in production of, auto-
mobiles, because new demand will fall off before replace-
ment demand has sufficiently developed to take up the slack.
Therefore a too rapid expansion of a durable goods industry
is likely to lead to a more or less serious setback. Moreover,
this drop in demand for the durable good may easily show
a tendency to recur at certain intervals, without any fresh
disturbances having occurred; such a wavelike movement is
the so-called "replacement cycle."23
The idea of a reinvestment or replacement cycle is fairly
simple. Such a cycle occurs if a stock of durable goods (say
of automobiles) has been built up "too quickly," production
having been more or less concentrated within a few years.
If we assume that the durability or service life of different
cars is, if not the same, at least not too different, then it is
clear that the cars built in the same year will come up for
scrapping and replacement at around the same point of time.
It would be easy to make rigid, simplifying assumptions
22Intechnical terms we might say that present and future services are in
joint supply.
28 especiallyJ. Einarsen, Reinvestment Cycles and Their Manifestation
in the Norwegian Shipping Industry (Oslo 19S8).130 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
and deduce from them a perfectly regular replacement cycle.
Itis clear, however, that we should not expect to find a
regular cycle of this sort in reality. Of the numerous reasons
that make such regularity unlikely, a few may be briefly
indicated. First, durability is not the same for all automo-
but varies according to model, make and individual
circumstances such as operating conditions, care in main-
ten ance, accidents and the like. Second, as was pointed out
before, the age at which a car will be scrapped is by no
means determined only by technological considerations but
ma.y be advanced or postponed (within very wide limits) ac-
cording to the economic situation (in periods of depression
scrapping is delayed, in prosperity periods it is hastened, to
a ririuch greater degree than might be expected). And third,
thetotal demand for automobiles does not remain un-
nor does it grow in a regular fashion; rather it
flui:tuates under the influence of numerous factors such as
the level of income, price of automobiles, condition of high-
ways, operating cost and the like. Taking all these factors
intD consideration we should expect not a regular replace-
ment cycle but fluctuations in replacements.
The foregoing analysis would lead us to conclude, then,
tha.t a structural expansion of instalment credit may con-
tribute to the emergence of fluctuations in particular dura-
ble goods industries if it too greatly accelerates their devel-
op:Inent, and that if a temporary saturation is reached in the
demand for a particular durable good there may be not only
a drop in demand but also a tendency toward recurrent dis-
turbances because of fluctuations in replacements.
Before proceeding to another subject it may be pointed
out that the relationships just discussed have another conse-
quence. Durable goods, besides being an active source of
dis making for changes in output and national in-
come, are likely to impair stability by reacting strongly to
in income caused by other factors.
Suppose there is a general depression attended by a fall
in aggregate effective demand, however brought about. Con-CONSEQUENCES OF FLUCTUATIONS 131
sumersare forced to cut down their expenditure all around.
If their outlay for a non-durable good is reduced by, say, 25
percent, and if prices and costs are rigid, production need
not fall by more th.an 25 percent. The instantaneous reac-
tion may be stronger, for example because stocks may be
reduced; but stocks can be reduced quickly, and thus it can
be assumed that production will soon settle down at a new
level 25 percent below the old one.24
On the other hand, if demand for automobile transporta-
tion services falls by 25 percent the chances are that the
output of automobiles will temporarily drop very sharply,
possibly to zero. The reason is, of course, the durability of
the instrument. The greater the durability the larger the
stock of services stored up, as it were, in the durable goods.
When the demand for these services falls, the excess stock
must be used up before new goods will be produced.25 Hence
the immediate relation of the output of durable goods to a
given fall in effective demand is likely to be stronger than
in the case of perishable goods. Also, this immediate reaction
will be stronger than the permanent reaction. If the demand
for automobile services falls by 25 percent and then stays at
the new level, in the long run automobile production need
not fall by more than 25 percent. It is very likely, however,
that temporarily it will fall much more sharply, and that
the new level will be reached only after a considerable delay.
Naturally such a sharp reaction of durable goods produc-
tion to a fall in demand will affect employment and income.
Workers in the durable goods industries will be thrown out
of work and be forced to cut down outlay. This adds to the
Stocks, in a sense, introduce in themselves an element of durability and
give rise to acceleration in a manner analogous to the operation of durable
equipment. See Haberler, cit., p. 94.
25 The "stocks of services" stored in durable instruments have the further
peculiarity that they can be used only successively in while stocks
of perishable goods, say of food, can be used up quickly. Hence by a price
cut stocks of non-durable goods can be deared quickly and forced into
consumption, but in the case of durable goods there are serious limitations
(unless the price falls to the scrapping level). For further details see ibid.,
p. 341.132 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
cumulative force of depression processes.26 This is the reason
why it was said that instalment credit makes for instability
when it induces people in the long run to devote a larger
percentage of their income and resources to the production
and use of durable as compared with non-durable goods.
EFFECTS OF CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS
Let us now assume that the system of consumer instalment
has reached a mature age—that the institutional and
legal setting has been effectively developed and that the at-
titude of the public in general does not undergo any further
change, at least for the time being. We may assume also that
transition from a steeply rising trend to a stationary situ-
ation (or an only slightly rising trend) has been made
sn:Loothly, or that the disturbances set up by the transition
have subsided.
It might be thought, and has actually been said, that in
these circumstances instalment credit ceases to be an mdc-
p(:ndent factor influencing economic fluctuations.27 In this
argument it is granted that when there is a cyclical movement
business activity in general, and of sales to consumers in
particular, we should expect also instalment credit sales, and
censequently the volume of outstanding credit, to move in
cycles; but these fluctuations are interpreted as a mere reflex
of the ups and downs in the volume of retail sales, and not
as an independent factor.
In a certain sense this argument is correct, but in another,
niore important sense, it is not. It is correct in the sense
that cycles in general business, and particularly in the volume
of retail sales, can be regarded as the cause, and cycles in
ir:tstalment credit as the effect. Even this is not a logical neces-
sity, for instalment credit could conceivably exhibit cycles
28 For further elaborations see J. M. Clark, Strategic Factors in Business
Ci'cles (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1934) passim, and Haberler,
cit., pp. 34-44.
27 The argument in the following pages was largely prompted by discus-
sion and correspondence with Professors J. A. Schumpeter and J. Viner and
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of its own, causally independent of the general business
cycle:28 the mere fact that the instalment credit cycle moves
parallel to the business cycle is not in itself a sufficient reason
for taking the latter as the cause and the former as the effect.
But this parallelism of credit cycle and business cycle, in con-
junction with certain other facts, seems to warrant the con-
clusion that the business cycle may be regarded as sub-
stantially independent of, and responsible for, the cycle in
instalment credit: there were business cycles long before in-
stalment credit reached its present level of development,
there are business cycles in countries where instalment credit
is little developed, and even in the United States the con-
tribution of instalment credit to total consumer expenditure,
although not negligible, is not very great as compared with
other factors. The dog wags the tail and not the tail the dog.
From this it does not follow, however, that fluctuations
in instalment credit will not influence general business.29
Although the dog wags the tail, the wagging tail (if it is big
enough) will affect the swings of the dog; the same muscular
exertion will produce larger and longer swings in a dog with
a big tail than in one with a small tail.
Let us assume that instalment credit depends in the most
direct and mechanical fashion upon the ups and downs of
general business; this would mean that the time series of
instalment sales is similar in amplitude and timing to the
series of total sales, in other words, that a constant proportion
of total sales is made on credit. Even in this most straight-
forward case in which credit could be called a mere reflex
of business cycles,30 instalment credit will exert an influence
28Thefirst introduction and institutional development must be regarded
as a factor that is independent of the business cycle. But we are here con-
cerned with the fluctuations of creditafterthe institutional framework
has reached a stable position.
29thefact that it draws this conclusion lies the weakness of the argu-
ment that instalment credit ceases to be an independent factor after the
upward trend has come to an end.
801t has been suggested that we could speak of an independent influence of
credit only if one of two conditions were fulfilled: first, if the amplitude of
the fluctuations of credit sales were greater than that of the fluctuations of
cash sales; or second, if the curve of credit showed a lead at the turning134. ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
on business cycles in general and on the cycle of total retail
sales—one of the most important manifestations of business
cycles—in particular. For, as we have seen, such a cycle in
new credits will, under the usual repayment conditions, pro-
du::e a similar cycle in the volume of outstanding credit,
though the latter will show a slight lag at the turning points,
a lag whose length will depend on the factors indicated in
Chapter 3. Such cyclical fluctuations of credit outstandings
cannot be regarded as a neutral or irrelevant phenomenon
for business cycles. On the contrary, as will be shown in
subsequent pages, we are forced to conclude from them that
credit is an intensifying factor in business cycles—accentuat-
ing booms and deepening depressions. In other words, it op-
erates as a resonator or amplifier of fluctuations set up by
other forces. Presumably, however, it influences not only the
amplitude but also the timing of business cycles, that is, it
tends to shift the turning points, although it is not immedi-
ately clear in which direction.3'
This reciprocal stimulation of different factors, implying
as it does that the same factor may play the dual role of
cai.tse and effect, is not a peculiarity of instalment credit; it
is a. very frequent phenomenon not only in the cycle mech-
but in economic relationships in general.
f the argument in earlier chapters is valid it seems to
fo].low from the cyclical fluctuations of outstandings that in-
stalment credit has an intensifying influence on the business
I: would berash,forexample,to conclude withoutfurtherproof
that every factor tending to widen the amplitude of the cycle will tend
a factor may conceivably shortenit;or
its influence on the length of the cycle may be different in different cir-
points in comparison with the curve of cash sales. It is not easy to say definitely
either of these conditions is actually fulfilled. There is little evidence
to that amplitude is notably greater in the case of credit than of cash
(see Chart XII, below; this chart is based on annual data, because the
stai:istical methods of deriving monthly series relating to commodity credit
render it unsafe to draw rigid conclusions regarding the deviations of intra-
year fluctuations in cash and credit sales, as was emphasized on p. 63 above).
As to the second condition, the annual figures do not show credit sales
leading or lagging behind cash sales at the turning points, and itis not
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cycle. During cyclical upswings consumer expenditures are
inflated; during cyclical downswings they are deflated. If
there were no instalment credit available in periods of gen-
eral expansion, people who have no salable assets could not
increase their expenditure by more than the current incre-
ment in their income. There might even be a lag between
the increase in income and the increase in their expenditure,
if they decided to devote the whole or part of their incre-
ment in income to the acquisition of expensive durable
goods and began to accumulate the necessary cash. It is true
that people of wealth could sell some of their salable assets,
and this dissaving might have a stimulating effect similar
to that of consumer borrowing. But as was pointed out in
Chapter 2, it is unlikely that the public as a whole would
do this to an extent comparable to their credit purchases
when credit is easily available.
Similarly, in periods of general contraction people would
probably spend more on consumption if they were not com-
pelled to use a part of their current income for repaying
debts that they had contracted in the past upswing. Here
again it might be that some would choose to save a part of
the funds which they actually need for the service and re-
demption of their debts, and this saving would in most cir-
cumstances have a depressive effect equal or nearly equal to
the liquidation of the debt. But is it not very likely that
they would use for consumption expenditure at least a part
of the money otherwise needed for the debt service?
In the field of producer credit there is a perfect analogy
to this intensifying effect of consumer instalment credit. Sup-
pose, for example, that when incomes rise, people spend for
housing instead of for automobiles (or rather, for transporta-
tion services); then the demand for dwelling space rises
and private entrepreneurs seize the opportunity and build
houses.32 They finance their investment through producer
credit channels, and producer credit, instead of consumer
32Mortgagecredit on family housesoffers,of course, an equally good
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credit, will expand. Or it may be that the demand for other
coi:nmodities rises and the respective producers are induced
to increase their productive capacity. For this to happen a
necessary condition is, of course, that producers expect the
in::reased demand for their products to last long enough to
make the investment profitable.33 If this condition is fulfilled
producer credit operates in such a way as to intensify the
cumulative force of economic expansions and contractions.
Credit, or more precisely the existence of an elastic credit
supply, is then one of the factors responsible for the self-
reinforcing nature of booms and depressions. This view is
ge:cierally accepted by students of business cycles, although
distribution of emphasis between credit and other factors
varies a great deal from writer to writer.34
Consumer instalment credit is no exception to the rule;
it tends to operate in exactly the same way as credit in gen-
eral has always been supposed to operate. Its introduction
on, a large scale, and its spread to larger and larger groups
of the population and to more and more commodities, ex-
tend the economic sphere which is subject to the destabiliz-
ing influence of credit.
It will be observed that the foregoing argument rests on
the assumption, well established statistically, that outstand-
ing credit moves parallel with the We need not assume
that the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations in credit sales is
greater than the amplitude in cash sales. Even if it were
smaller (if, in other words, the percentage of credit sales in
total sales were smaller in peak years than in trough years
of a business cycle) our argument would On the other
hand, if the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations in credit sales
is greater than that of cash sales, the effect of credit will be
33Analogouslyas we have seen above, a consumer whose income has
must expect that his higher income will last for a certain time; other-
wise he is not likely to be induced by the rise in income to buy durable
consumer goods on credit.
Thepoint can be couched in very different words. In Keynes' terminology.
example, it finds expression in the proposition that an increase in the
m:irginal efficiency of capital could not lead to a rise in output and em-
pJ.oymentifthe liquidity preference schedule were quite inelastic.CONSEQUENCES OF FLUCTUATIONS 137
stronger. It has already been mentioned, however, that there
is not much evidence that credit sales fluctuate more vio-
lently than cash sales. As can be seen from Chart XI, the
CHART XI
ANNUAL INSTALMENT SALES IN PERCENT OF ANNUAL TOTAL SALES









Data for 1925-38 from National Bureau of Economic Research (Financial
Research Program), The Volume of Consumer Instalment Credit, 1 929-38, by
Duncan McC. Hoithausen, in collaboration with Malcolm L. Merriam and
Roif Nugent (1940) P. 47. Automobile data for 1939-40 from National Auto-
mobile Dealers Association; other 1939-40 data from U. S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Current Business
Analysis Unit. Data on household appliance and jewelry stores available only
from 1928. For automobile dealers the percentage figures apply to units of
passenger cars sold; for other groups they apply to volume of sales. The
vertical lines indicate general business cycle turning points (calendar-year
dates), as determined by W. C. Mitchell and A. F. Burns of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
relationship of various retailers' credit sales to their total
sales shows traces of a systematic cyclical behavior only in
the case of automobile dealers, and even there the cyclical
pattern is not very pronounced. In the case of the other re-
tail establishments there is hardly a. trace of cyclical change.
(percent)
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It is impossible to construct series of cash and instalment
sales for single commodities35 except in the case of new auto-
mobiles. In that case, as Chart XII shows, there is evidence
that the amplitude of fluctuations in credit sales is slightly
greater than that in cash sales.3°
(:)ur conclusion that consumer instalment credit tends to
in the same sense in
which it is frequently said that government finance tends
to intensify cyclical swings if there are deficits in prosperity
years and surpluses in depression years. In the same sense
it is frequently urged that the government, in order to miti-
gate fluctuations in business, should manage its finances in
such a way (by shifting postponable expenditures, changing
taxes and the like) as to create deficits in depression years
and surpluses in prosperity years.
lIt was shown, however, in Chapter 3, that the characteri-
zatfion of a factor as stimulating or depressing may be dif-
ferent if, in addition to its direct effects, all its indirect
effects over a period of time are taken into consideration.
To these indirect effects we must now give some thought.
Suppose we are at the beginning of a cyclical upswing.
In(::omes rise, thus inducing a number of people to buy
durable goods on the instalment plan. They increase their
expenditure by more than the increment in their income.
Tl:Lese additional consumer expenditures will stimulate pro-
du.ction and raise the income of producers (wages, salaries
and profits) in the durable goods industries and the industries
Ii: has been pointed out by David Durand that if we took as a measure
for instalment sales the new credits series relating to department stores,
for example, and compareditwithtotaldepartmentstoresales,we
couLd not be sure that we were comparing identical commodities:itis
probable that department storeinstalmentsalescomprise goodsofa
durable and more expensive nature than do department store cash
saks. It follows that a comparison of the two may show the effects of
duitability and high unit cost rather than the effects of credit.
36I:should be mentioned that some authorities—Roif Nugent, forex-
ample—are of the opinion that credit sales do, in general, exhibit a larger
amplitude in their cyclical fluctuations than do cash sales. We can afford,
however, to be cautious inthis matter. Our argumentisnot seriously
a greater amplitude in credit sales, although this fact
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thatsupply them with equipment and material. These people
in turn will spend at least a part of their higher income;
CHART XII
INDICES OF ANNUAL INSTALMENT AND CASH SALES OF NEW PAS-
SENGER AUTOMOBILES, 1928_40a
(index)












Indices computed from annual figures on number of cars sold on instalment
and number sold for cash; these figures obtained from two sets of data, as
follows. Data on total number of cars sold: for 1928-38 taken from National
Bureau of Economic Research (Financial Research Program), The Volume of
Consumer Instalment Credit, 1929-38, by Duncan McC. Hoithausen, in col-
laboration with Malcolm L. Merriam and Rolf Nugent (1940) p. 112; for
1939-40 obtained from Automobile Manufacturers Association. Data on
percent of cars sold on instalment:for 1928-33 taken from Automobile
Manufacturers Association, Automobile Facts and Figures (1934) p. 73; for
1934-37 from National Association of Sales Finance Companies,
Experience of Sales Finance Companies and Automobile Dealers, 1938; for
1938-40 from National Automobile Dealers Association. The vertical lines
indicate general business cycle turning points (calendar-year dates), as deter-
mined by W. C. Mitchell and A. F. Burns of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
some will be induced to spend more than their increment
in income by making use of instalment credit. There will
be other types of repercussions which have been called
0
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terdary effects: when demand rises all around, producers in
variDus fields may be induced to invest in equipment and
working capital. Existing equipment, underutilized when
the upswing started, will gradually be drawn into employ-
mer.t, and sooner or later new installations will become
Producers become more optimistic when sales
rise and some of them will be induced to increase their ex-
penditures by more than the increment in demand that they
experienced. These new investments37 will be financed
by 1:ank credit, by new issues or by idle balances at the dis-
posal of the investing firms; this will again create incomes,
and so on in an indefinite chain. Each act of expenditure
will draw a whole series of other expenditures in its wake.
This reciprocal stimulation of consumption and investment,
of consumer spending and producer spending, is well known
in l:'usiness cycle theory and has been styled by some econo-
mists the interaction of "multiplier" and "acceleration"
principles.
Unfortunately, in the present state of our knowledge, we
are not able to trace this process in detail quantitatively.
Even for qualitative analysis, that is to say, for an analysis
which confines itself to indicating the direction of such a
(and does not try to ascertain speed and magnitude)
the limitations are severe. This is true for a microscopic
analysis of particular elements in the situation (for example,
the role of instalment credit) as well as for a macroscopic
analysis of the economic, process as a whole. It is possible,
of c:ourse, to make specific assumptions about "multiplier"
and, "acceleration coefficient" (and other magnitudes), and
In so far as these investments serveto compensate, at the beginning
ofacyclical upswing,forthe disinvestmentthat occurred during the
deprc!ssion (when replacements were neglected and capital stock was al-
to decrease), and, thus to bring capital stock backtothe level
oftI:telast business peak, we may speak of reinvestment instead of new
investment. It has frequently been overlooked that the same act of pro.
duction may be regarded eitheras new investment or as reinvestment,
according to the standard of reference:itis reinvestment from the point
of view of the capital stock existing at the previous peak (in a historical
sense), but it is new investment from the point of view of the depression
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to figure out what will be, under these assumptions, the
series of secondary and tertiary expenditures emanating from
a series of primary expenditures. But the results vary widely,
quantitatively and qualitatively, according to the numerical
magnitudes attached to the assumed facts. Under one set
of assumptions an initial act of expenditure will set up a
series of expenditures that gradually dwindles and disappears.
Under another set the series approaches some upper limit
that will then be maintained indefinitely. Under still other
assumptions there is first a movement in one direction, which
is then followed by a movement in the opposite direction,
which again reverses itself, and so on; these oscillations may
go on indefinitely ("undamped" oscillations), they may grow
in intensity ("anti-damped" Or "explosive" oscillations) or
they may flatten out and subside more or less rapidly like
the waves created by a stone falling into a pond ("damped"
oscillations) 38
It follows that we are not in a position to know the sum
total of all indirect effects of a series of increases in instal-
ment credit outstandings. It is not impossible that they
become negative, in other words, that instalment credit tends
to exert a downward pull on consumer expenditure before
outstanding credit has reached its cyclical maximum. An
important, but unfortunately negative, conclusion is thus
to be drawn: even though the curve of total instalment credit
88Numerous"sequence models" ofthis kind have been worked out by
varioustheorists.See,for example, P. A. Samuelson, "Interactions Be-
tween the Multiplier Analysis and the Principle of Acceleration" in Re-
view of Economic Statistics, vol. 21 (May 1939), and the more complicated
models constructed by Eric Lundberg, Studies in the Theory of Economic
Expansion (London 1937) Chapter 9. Tinbergen hastriedtoconstruct
such dynamic schemes empirically for certain periods and Countries by
determining lags and coefficients from statistical data;seehisStatistical
Testing of Business Cycle Theories, 2 vols. (Geneva 1939), An Econometric
Approach to Business Cycle Problems (Paris 1937), Les fondements mathé.
matiques de Ia stabilisation du mouvement des affaires (Paris 1938). These
researches, however, have not yet reached a stage that would allow an
application to our problem. It is for this reason that it has been decided
heretocharacterize instalmentcreditas stimulating or depressingac-
cordingtoitsdirectcontributiontoconsumer expenditure and not
according to the sum of its indirect effects.142 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
out:standings does not precede (but rather tends to lag a little
behind) the turn in general business cycles, it is not possible
todefinitely that instalment credit has not been an ac-
force in bringing about the turn in business.30 It was
shown in Chapter 3 that it cannot be said, except under one
particular and unrealistic set of assumptions, that the cumu-
lati.ve direct and indirect effects of an increasing series of
oua:standings will begin to become negative precisely at the
point where the curve of net credit change begins to decline
(in other words, when the rate of increase in outstandings
reaches its maximum), although it is at this point that the
contributionof creditto consumer expenditure
reaches its maximum. The critical point comes probably
later.
1t should be observed that our conclusion to the effect
that instalment credit has operated in such a way as to
intensify business upswings and downswings would not need
to be modified if we were to accept current net credit change
(rai:her than outstandings) as the indicator of stimulating
or depressing influence. For, as we have seen in Chapter 3,
current net credit change too has tended to rise and fall
with the cycle. It is true that in 1937, and probably also in
the curve of current net credIt change culminated be-
fore the turn in general business, and that it reached its
low point in 1932 before the upturn in general business
which occurred in 1933. But even if we were to subscribe
to the argument resulting in the acceptance of this curve
as indicator of the stimulating or retarding effect of credit on
totil sales, the conclusion that credit intensifies the cycle
not be modified, for the lead of the turning points in
thcurve of net credit change as compared with the turns
in the general business cycle ("reference cycle") is not very
great. (Because of the irregularity of the curve of net credit
its turning points cannot be located with• absolute
view ofitsrelatively small magnitude, however, instalmentcredit
Cannot have been a very important factor, compared with other factors
such as government finance, in bringing about any one of the last four
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precision.) If we relax the rigid assumption of 100 percent
leakage, which underlies the theory that current net credit
change indicates the sum total of stimulating effects, and
assume a leakage of substantially less than 100 percent, the
critical point at which retarding forces begin to prevail will
come after (according to the assumptions, long after) the
curve of net credit change has reached its cyclical peak.
Our conclusion, then, is this: the fact that the turning
points in the curve of net credit change precede the turns
in general business may perhaps indicate that instalment
credit helped to precipitate the downturns of the business
cycle in 1929 and 1937 and to start the upturn in 1933;
it does not impair the conclusion that instalment credit
tended to accentuate booms and depressions.
It should be noted, however, that the conclusion that in-
stalment credit tends to accentuate economic fluctuations
does not settle the question whether it tends to raise or to
lower the long-run level of output and employment. This
question cannot be answered with a high degree of confi-
dence, for reasons pointed out at the beginning of the chap-
ter: the answer depends not only upon certain facts relat-
ing to instalment credit, on which our information is scanty
(such as its long-run influence on saving), but also upon one's
attitude concerning business cycles in general, the role of
money and credit in the cycle mechanism and the diagnosis
of concrete situations. Since this is not the place to attempt
a solution of these problems, a few remarks must suffice.
In Chapter 2 it was pointed out that in the long run in-
stalment credit may tend to weaken the borrowers' pro-
pensity to save.40 Those economists who attribute economic
40Itwill be recalled that this is the case if new credits entail an increase
in consumer outlay(are not a mere substitutefordissaving in other
forms) while repayments are made at the expense of saving rather than
consumption expenditure(are a substitutefor other formsofsaving).
What has been deemed probableis,however, merely an approximate
realization ofthissituation,thatistosay,that repayments are to a
higher degree a substitute for saving than new credits are a substitute
for dissaving, in other words, that consumer expenditures are reduced
less by repayments than they are augmented by new credits.144 ECONOMICFLUCTUATIONS
stagitiation and unemployment in modern communities to
a ch ronic tendency of saving to outrun available investment
opp:)rtunities, will conclude that instalment credit, by re-
ducing the propensity to save, tends to raise the long-run
leve'. of output and employment. They need not deny that
it accentuates cyclical fluctuations; they could admit that
in t]:ie absence of this type of credit cyclical swings would be
milder. But they will argue that the average level of output
over the whole cycle would be lower. Prosperity peaks
would be lower; depression troughs, however, need not be
less deep, at least not sufficiently to prevent the long-run
of economic activity from being lower.
A different attitude will be adopted by those who believe
that economic progress, as measured by the rise in national
inco:rne and production, depends, among other things, on the
accumulation of capital and the willingness to save. They
will say that inasmuch as instalment credit islikely, in
the long run, to reduce the propensity to save, it tends to
retard to some extent economic progress.
No choice between these two attitudes will here be at-
tempted. It can be said with confidence, however, that the
issue is not an important one. We do not know precisely how
saving is actually affected in the long run by the operation
of instalment credit. But it is safe to say that the influence
is not a very big one, that the change in saving which is
possibly brought about by instalment credit does not amount
to more than a fraction of the net change in this type of
credit. Moreover, net change in consumer instalment credit
itsel:E is only a small fraction of total national income, or
even, of the income of the groups in which such credit is
largely concentrated. Hence only a small fraction of aggregate
savi]:ig can be involved, a fraction that can hardly influence
the to an appreciable extent.41
"A. G. Hart stresses the fact that consumer instalment credit, by divert-
ing consumer demand, "destroys investment opportunities in streetrail-
ways and (if one considers the alternatives to spending money on auto.
mobileoperation)probablyinhousing."SeehisreviewofNugent's
Consumer Credit and Economic Stability in Journal of Political Economy, vol.CONSEQUENCES OF FLUCTUATIONS 145
COMPARATIVE QUANTITATIVE IMPORTANCE
The question arises now of the magnitude of instalment
credit's influence on the economic system as compared with
that of other factors. Is instalment credit a negligible factor,
an important one or one of overwhelming weight? Several
writers, in explaining the ups and downs of business cycles
during the period between the two world *ars, have assigned
a more or less important role to changes in consumer credit.
A. H. Hansen has been mentioned already. J. M. Clark42
and S: H. Slichter43 sketch the cycle-accentuating force of con-
sumer credit in much the same way as was done in the fore-
going pages. At the time of the appearance of these books,
•however, no reliable data were available on the volume of
consumer credit and its changes over the cycle. Nugent's book
contains the first comprehensive attempt at a quantitative ap-
praisal of the role of consumer credit in recent cycle phases.44
What standard is to be used in appraising the economic
importance of instalment credit? It has been emphasized that
changes in outstandings measure the contribution of instal-
ment credit to consumer expenditure. When these changes
are positive, that is, so long as outstandings grow, credit
adds to consumer expenditure and stimulates business;
when they are negative and outstandings fall, credit reduces
expenditure and exerts a depressing influence on economic
activity. The procedure indicated by this reasoning is to
compare changes in outstandings, that is, net credit change,
with national income and consumer expenditure, and with
certain factors—such as income-creating expenditure of the
federal government and changes in mortgage credit, farm
and urban—which affect national income and consumer ex-
42InStrategic Factors in Business Cycles (1934) passim.
In Towards Stability (1934) p. 29.
Nugent,op. cit., Chapter 8. Nugent, however, does not confine himself
to instalment credit.
49 (1941) p. 180. This consideration further detracts from the importance
of the long-run influence of consumer credit on consumer saving.See







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FOOTNOTES TO TABLE 6
'In millions of dollars. Minus signindicatesanegative change (with
repayments exceeding new credits); otherwise a positive change (with new
credits exceeding repayments)isto be understood. Figures refer to corn-
modil.y credit and cash loans combined. For 1929-38 data on commodity
credit pertain to dealers in new and used automobiles, department stores,
fUrniture stores, household appliance stores, jewelry stores and "all other
stores"; for 1939-40 data are unavailable on "all other stores," a compre-
hensiie category accounting for only a small fraction of net credit change.
For the entire period data on cash loans pertain to commercial banks'
loan departments, creditunions,industrial banking companies
and personal finance companies, and are exclusive of unregulated lenders
and insured FHA (TitleI)loans. All data for1929-38 from National
of Economic Research (Financial Research Program), The Volume
of Consumer Instalment Credit, 1929-38, by Duncan McC. Hoithausen, in
collaboration with Malcolm L. Merriam and Roif Nugent (1940) p. 99. Data
for 1939-40 supplied by U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of For-
eign and Domestic Commerce, Current Business Analysis Unit.
b In millions of dollars. Data from U. S. Department of Commerce, Survey
of Current Business (June 1941) Table 8, p. 17.
oMinussign indicates that one of the two magnitudes is negative.
d In :cnillions of dollars. Figures refer to the net flow of all durable and
nOn.clurahle consumer goods (and services), exclusive of residential build-
ing. Data from National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper
No.NationalIncome 1919-1938, by Simon Kuznets (1941) p. 7.
oIn of dollars. The groups reporting incomes of $5000 a year or
less are estimated to contain 97 percent of those indebted for instalment
credi:; their income is computed as exclusive of work relief wages, divi-
and interest. Data for 1929-37 developed by U. S. Department of
Com:inerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, National Income
Division. Data for 1938-40 are estimated from total income payments by
earliertotal income payments and earlier income payments
to the $5000-and-under group.
Estimated. See footnote e above.
not include "all other stores"; see footnote a above.
hDai:aunavailable.
In millions of dollars. Figures refer to expenditure of the federal govern-
Data for 1929 are available only for the second half of the year, and
are Data for1930-31, calculated by H. H. Villard,are from
A.1).Gayer, "FiscalPolicies,"in American Economic Review, vol.28,
no.Supplement (March 1938) p. 99. Data for 1932-40 from Board of
Govrnors of the Federal Reserve System, "Revised Estimates of Federal
Net Contribution," mimeographed release (May 1941).
'In millions ofdollars. Minus signindicatesa negative change. Data
for :1929-38 from Donald C. Horton, "Fluctuations in Outstanding Farm-
MorI:gage Debt,1910-1939"inAgricultural Finance Review (NOvember
1939p.14. Data for 1939-40 from Agricultural Finance Review (May
1941;) p. 56.
kInmillions of dollars. Minus sign indicates a negative change;other-
wise a positive change isto be understood. Figures referto mortgage
loan; outstanding on 1-to-4 family non-farm homes. Data from Federal
Bank Review, vol. 6 (September 1940) p. 412.CONSEQUENCES OF FLUCTUATIONS 149
penditure in much the same way as changes in instalment
credit do. Such comparisons are presented in Table
A study of the figures in this table, especially those show-
ing net credit change in relation to national income, to con-
sumer expenditure and to the income received by those
classes that represent the bulk of instalment borrowers,
suggests that the cyclical importance of instalment credit
during the period 1929-40, while not negligible, was not
very great: instalment credit tended to accentuate the cycle
but cannot well be regarded as a major factor in the cyclical
fluctuations of general economic activity in these years. It
is hardly possible, for example, to attribute the great violence
of cyclical fluctuations during these years to the influence
of consumer instalment credit. On the other hand, in the
years before 1929, when instalment credit outstandings were
451twill perhaps be objected that a comparison should be made not
between annual netcreditchange and national income butbetween
annual net credit change and annual change in national income. Such
a comparison would of course yield much higher percentages, as can be
seen from the following figures:
Net Credit Change in % of Annual Change in National Income
192919301931193219331934193519361937193819391940
9.6 6.1 4.15.2 —3.93.01238.97.47.812.919.0
(The minus sign in 1933 indicates that the change in credit was positive
in that year, while the change in national income was still negative: national
income still fell, but credit expanded, for the first time after the depres-
sion.)
But what is the rationale of this comparison? If these proportions were
consistently very high—say several hundred percent, as they conceivably
could be—ought we to say that creditis an extremely important factgr
even though in percent of the national income as such it might be very
small? In my opinion such a conclusion would be entirelyunjustified,
except in very special cases which are never realized. There are many
factors affecting national income much more powerfully than instalment
credit. Hence if in certain periods net credit change is large as compared
with the change in national income, the reason will most likely be that
in these periods the influences of other factors happen to cancel out to
considerableextent,not thatcreditisan importantfactor,either
absolutely or in comparison with other forces influencing national income.
We may therefore condude that the more significant comparison is with
national income as such, and not with the change in income.
It may be contended too that the smallness of net credit change as
compared with national income is misleading, because the former is subject
to the operation of the "multiplier." This aspect of the problem is dis-
cussed in the following pages.150 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
buili; up to the 1929 peak, the importance of credit was
probably greater.
T]riis conclusion is strengthened by the consideration that
net :redit change probably somewhat overstates the direct
cont:ribution of instalment credit to consumer expenditure
and to national income. The reasons for this have been dis-
cussed at length in earlier parts of the present study: in some
cases instalment credit is merely a substitute for other forms
of d:i.ssaving; to some (unknown) extent it merely induces a
tem]:)orary advancement of expenditure, that is, the instal-
ment buyer would have bought anyway, but a little later;
an i:ticrease in consumer expenditure may lead merely to a
decline in inventories rather than to an increase in output
(national income); sometimes consumer instalment credit
may be merely a substitute for producer credit, as A. G.
Har!: suggests;4° to some extent it may be transfer credit,
that is to say, changes in consumer instalment credit may
affect the supply of credit for other purposes. This last factor,
was probably of only minor importance during
the period under consideration, except perhaps in the first
two or three years (1929-31).
On the other hand it must not be forgotten that net credit
chal:Lge is subject to the "multiplier" effect: its total influence,
direct plus indirect, through successive reexpenditure
the sums involved, will be greater, possibly several times
greater, than the original magnitude. Itis unfortunately
impossible to assign with any confidence a concrete figure
to the multiplier. But let us try with all reservations the
figu:ce which is usually mentioned by authorities such as
J. M. Clark and J. M. Keynes, who assume for the United
a multiplier of somewhere between 2.5 and 3. If we
multiplied the percentage figures in Table 1 by 2.5 or 3 the
highest ratios we would obtain for net credit change in per-
46Thatisto say, an expansion in consumer credit may reduce demand
for producer credits. when, for example, private automobiles take the place
of ta.,c.is, buses and streetcars.CONSEQUENCES OF FLUCTUATIONS 151
cent of national income would be +3.5,this in 1940, and
—4.4,this in 1932.
The complication concerning the multiplier does not arise
when we compare net credit change with some of the other
factors that affect national income similarly. The reason is
that these other factors are presumably subject to the opera-
tion of the same multiplier.
The net income-creating expenditure of the federal gov-
ernment47—which in the field of government finance can be
regarded as the measure of cyclical importance corresponding
to net credit change in the field of consumer instalment
credit—was positive throughout the period under considera-
tion. During the three years, 1930, 1931 and 1932, when
net credit change was negative and instalment credit tended
to accentuate the depression, government finance exerted a
stimulating effect.48 As for the comparative magnitudes4°
of instalment credit and government finance, it can be seen
from the column showing net credit change in percent of
income-creating government expenditure that except in
193050 the financial operations of the federal government
were a much more powerful factor than instalment credit.
Thismagnitude can be described as a slightly corrected cash deficit. But the
result of the comparison would not be materially changed ifthe cash
deficitfiguresas currently published by the Treasury were substituted
for those used here. The term net income-creating expenditure has been
criticized by A. W. Marget and H. H. Villard(in papers presented at
a meeting of the Conferenèe on Research in Fiscal Policy, National Bureau
of Economic Research, May 1941;see also H. H. Villard, Deficit
Spending and the National Income, 1941), on the ground that the series
measures not the direct contribution of government finance to national
income but rather its contribution to buying power or perhaps expendi-
ture. This fact, however, does not impair the comparability of this series
and net credit change, for the latterissubject to the same limitation.
It measures the direct contribution of creditto consumer expenditure.
The direct contribution to national income, or output, may be less than
that, for a change in consumer expenditure may lead toa change in
inventories rather than in current output.
48Itgoes without saying that only its direct, "mechanical" effect is here
under consideration. Psychological effects may have been negative.
Theabsolute magnitudes, disregarding the fact that in some years net
credit change was negative.
Andprobably also 1929; data on net income-creating expenditure are
available only for the second half of that year, and are negative.152 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
The two types of mortgage credit for which comparable
are available—farm-mortgage loans and mortgage
on 1-to-4 family non-farm homes51—exhibit a cyclical
pattern different from that of consumer instalment credit.
From the columns showing the percentage relationship of
net i:hange in instalment credit to changes in these two types
of mortgage credit it can be seen that the relative importance
of instalment and mortgage credit52 changed greatly from
year to year, but on the whole the two types of mortgage
cred.it.and instalment credit were of a similar order of magni-
tudc.
For a few years there exist estimates of total outstandings
on tirban real estate indebtedness (including home mortgage
debt on 1-to-4 family homes). The estimates (in millions of
dollars) are as follows, in comparison with total instalment









Notonly are the totals on real estate indebtedness much
larger than instalment credit outstandings, but the pattern
611n thefieldof urban mortgage financethisisthe only continuous
series of debt figures available, but of all types of mortgage credit itis
the most dosely relatedto consumer instalmentcreditsince
the of the mortgaged non-farm l-to-4 family homes are owner-
occupied.
Dis regarding the directional sign.
Fo:1930 the figure on real estate indebtedness is from U. S. Department
of Cmmerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestià Commerce, Long-Term
in the United States (1937) p. 136; for 1934-37 the figures are from
"Trend of Long-Term Debts in the United States, 1934 to 1937" in Survey
of Ci'irrent Business (January 1939) Table 1. Both of these sources give a
for 1934, and the one used above is higher by 421 million dollars
than the one not used; a footnote in the Survey of Current Business
indicates, however, that the figure cited there has been revised upward
405i:nilliondollars from earlier estimates. On instalment credit outstand-
ings :;ee footnote a to Table 6 above.CONSEQUENCES OF FLUCTUATIONS 153
oftheir change is quite different: they exhibit a downward
movement over the whole period under consideration, and
their changes are proportionately much smaller. It may be
remarked that since they include debt on apartment houses
and commercial structures they contain a large measure of
what would be called producer credit.
It may be objected that the adoption of net credit change
as the basis for the above comparisons has the effect of
understating the economic importance of instalment credit.
In 1933, for example, when net credit change, at its lowest
level of about 100 million dollars, was unquestionably negli-
gible—about two-tenths of one percent of the national in-
come, about 5 percent of the income-creating expenditure
of the federal government—new credits amounted to over
2 billion dollars, of which, as was shown in Chapter 2,
from 70 to 80 percent was spent on durable consumer goods.
More than half of all automobiles, to take but one example,
were sold on credit. Can a factor which accounts for the sales
of about 1.5 billion dollars of durable goods and for more
than 50 percent of all automobile sales be characterized
as negligible or unimportant?54
These objections are not without interest but they can be
resolved by a careful consideration of what net credit change
does and what it does not signify. Two points must be dis-
tinguished. The first one is this: net credit change is a measure
for the total direct contribution made during the year to
consumer expenditure by new credits and repayments. (This
contribution could be offset by an equal increase or de-
crease of another expenditure item; itis for this reason
that the comparison with net income-creating expenditure is
pertinent.) The actually reported net credit change does not,
however, measure the importance of the effect that would
have resulted from a drastic curtailment of new credits. If
in any one of the years from 1929 through 1938 instalment
The same argument could be raised against taking income-creating ex-
penditure as a measure for the cyclical importance of government finance.
Income-creating expenditure is usually small in comparison with total gov-
ernment expenditure (which we may regard as corresponding to new credits).154 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
credit had been abolished, that is, if the granting of new
credits had ceased, though repayments on outstanding credits
continued, the effect on total consumer demand would, of
course, have been much greater in that year than is indicated
by the actual figures of changes in outstanding credit. In
the extreme case, with no new credits being granted and
the outstanding credits being completely liquidated by re-
payments during the year, net credit change would become
equal to the amount of outstandings at the beginning of the
year', which is certainly not a negligible quantity.
It. may be said, then, that net credit change provides a
measure of the actual direct contribution of instalment credit
to consumer demand, but not of the potential influence
which it may exert. This potential negative contribution is
quite substantial and could well be sufficient to precipitate
a sharp decline in business activity, if it came at an inoppor-
tune moment, when the economic system was not under the
influence of offsetting stimulating factors. In its long-run
however, such a liquidation or curtailment of credit
would be much less depressing, for after repayments had
the drain on consumer purchasing power and ex-
penliture would come to an end.55 (
Thesecond point to be kept in mind is that net credit
change measures the importance of instalment credit for total
consumer expenditure,. but not for particular industries.
On this latter aspect a few observations may be added now.
Th broad facts on which to base a judgment of this matter
are these: large proportions of all sales of durable consumer
goods are made on the instalment basis (data on various types
of goods were presented in Chapter these proportions
are especially high for automobile sales (between one-half
and. two-thirds); in most cases year-to-year changes in the
Bu.t because of the tendency of economic depressions to spread out cumula-
tively, it is not likely that the decline would come to an end at precisely the
moment when the force by which it was engendered ceased to operate, that
is to say, when instalment credit was liquidated (or, in a less extreme case,
when the curve of outstandings leveled out after a sharp drop).
For more detailed information see Hoithausen et a!., op. cit., p. 47.CONSEQUENCES OF FLUCTUATIONS 155
proportions are not very gTeat, and show no pronounced
cyclical pattern.57 Hence new credits move closely parallel
with total sales, and since sales to consumers go fairly parallel
with production, new credits fluctuate in close conformity
with production. This is shown clearly in Chart XIII for the
automobile and furniture industries.
What conclusions can we draw from this parallelism? Cer-
tainly not the conclusion that there is a one-way causal
relationship between the two series. We cannot, for example,
conclude that the drop of production from 1929 to 1933, the
rise from 1933 to 1937 and the drop in 1937 to 1938 were
caused by credit contraction and expansion.58 In Chapter 4
it was shown that the cyclical swings in instalment credit are
produced mainly by cyclical fluctuations in demand for credit,
and that changes in supply conditions probably play a less
important role.59 It follows that the parallelism in the fluctua-
tions of production and new credits is the effect of common
underlying factors: the business cycle as reflected in cyclical
fluctuations of consumer demand.
The conclusion seems warranted that a drastic curtailment
of credit would in the short run strongly affect the durable
consumer goods industries. It is certain that a sharp drop in
In Chapter 2 it was estimated that between 70 percent and 80 percent of
all consumer instalment credit is used for the purchase of durable goods. Let us
assume that it was 75 percent. If for each year in the period 1929-38 we take 75
percent of the new credits granted, and express these magnitudes in percent




Thus we may say that roughly between 40 and 50 percent of durable con-
sumer goods are sold on credit. (The figures used for the flow of durable
consumer goods are Kuznets' estimate. See footnote d to Table 6, above. The
definition of durable goods is "commodities that, without marked change
and retaining their essential physical identity, are ordinarily employed in
their ultimate uses more than three years." Residential buildings are, how-
ever, excluded.)
581n the automobile field Chart XIII suggests rather the opposite conclusion
for the years 1934 and 1935, because production recovered more quickly from
the depression trough than credit.
59During the years 1932-37 there was a substantial liberalization as to length
of contract and down payment percentage that must have contributed some-
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demand for durable goods such as automobiles would have
far-reaching repercussions, irrespective of how outstandings
behaved. It would upset production not only in the automo-
bile industry but in all tributary industries, such as steel,
rubber and the like. In view of the cumulative and self-
reinforcing nature of economic depressions such an effect
might make itself felt over a considerable period. But no
such drastic restriction of the supply of instalment credit has
yet occurred.
What the effect of such a curtailment of credit would be
in the long run it is difficult to say. It would probably bring
about some shift of consumer demand from durable to non-
durable goods, but whether to a very significant degree can-
not be determined with confidence. People might eventually
shift to other forms of financing, such as accumulating money
in advance and buying for cash.6° This is simply the converse
of the problem mentioned in Chapter 2 as to whether the
phenomenal rise of, say, the automobile industry would have
taken place in the absence of instalment credit, or would
only have been temporarily slowed up.
60 To some extent there might be a diversion to producer credit. If people
could not buy automobiles and refrigerators on the instalment plan they
might to some extent rent them. It is hardly convincing, however, to deny
that consumer instalment credit presents any new problem on the ground
that itis simply a substitute for producer credit (this position has been
taken by G. L. Schwartz, "Instalment Finance, The Nature of Consumer
Credit" in Economica, new series, vol. 3, 1936, pp. 182-95).
FOOTNOTE TO CHART xiiz—Indices of production, 1926-39, from Federal Re-
serveBulletin(August 1940) p. 830 (automobiles) and p. 836 (furniture); in.
dices of production, 1940, from Federal Reserve Bulletin (March 1941) p.
246. Indices of new credits, 1926-38, computed from National Bureau o(
Economic Research (Financial Research Program), The Volume of Consumer
Instalment Credit, 1929-38, by Duncan McC. Holthausen, in collaboration
with Malcolm L. Merriam and Roif Nügent (1940) pp. 49-53 (automobiles)
and pp. 59-63 (furniture); indices of new credits, 1939.40, computed from
provisional estimates made by the National Bureau, on the basis of data
supplied by U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce, Current Business Analysis Unit. No adjustment has been made
for seasonal variations. The vertical lines indicate general business cycle
turning points (monthly dates), as determined by W. C. Mitchell and A. F.
Burns of the National Bureau of Economic Research.